SAE NEWS | 01 AUGUST 2026
BY – FIDATO
28 July 2026
Saudi-Houthi talks took place in Muscat to prevent the collapse of the 2022 truce. However, both sides were quietly preparing for renewed hostilities, as the incentives for preserving the ceasefire appeared increasingly insufficient.
The Houthis had ostensibly entered the conflict in support of Iran during the second phase of the war. Yet the decision was likely driven more by their own strategic calculations than by solidarity with Iran.
Houthi militia wanted to maximize pressure on the vulnerable Saudis, whose oil exports are more dependent on the Red Sea than the Strait of Hormuz, to secure relief from the aerial and naval restrictions imposed since 2022.
Another factor may have been the calculation that Iran might not emerge from the conflict in a position to continue providing substantial military and economic support. If so, this could have been the best opportunity for the Houthis to extract economic concessions while their leverage remained high.
The Saudis, meanwhile, remained cautious about opening a new front but had ample incentives and perhaps compulsions to prepare for conflict.
If Iran emerged stronger and more confident after the war, the Houthis would be emboldened. From Riyadh’s perspective, it may have been better to act while Tehran was distracted and less capable of coming to the Houthis’ aid. The UAE-backed STC obstacle was more a problem.
Conversely, if the United States emerged with the upper hand, the incentive to consolidate Saudi influence and secure full control over Yemen where Riyadh had invested heavily would understandably have been even greater.
Source: FIDATO / X @tequieremos
